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Abstract
The intent of this study was to understand the role that solar PV plays in the
process of rural electrification, what barriers exist in the PV market, and how the
Rural Electrification Agency is bringing down those barriers. Moreover, I sought to
understand solar PV’s development impact in rural areas and how people in rural
regions of Uganda are using the technology, especially those at the bottom
of the economic pyramid. Additionally, I sought to understand if PV is a
financially viable option for the rural poor or if it is only obtainable by the rural
upper and middle class.
Consequently, I interned with the Rural Electrification Agency (REA)
in the ERT program, specifically with the solar PV department. While at REA, I
interviewed people from many departments in order to understand the bigger
picture of RE and what role PV plays in the process. I also took part in an end-user
audit induction, and worked with a team of end user auditors on an audit journey
to the West Nile region. Additionally, as part of my internship, I sat in on meetings,
looked over previous audit reports and reviewed REA policy documents.
I discovered that PV plays a subsidiary role in the process of RE. I also
discovered that the subsidy program for solar PV run by REA has been largely
ineffective at meeting its goals. Likewise, PV has struggled to reach people at the
bottom of the pyramid and caters mostly to the rural upper and middle classes. The
systems advanced by REA are often not well marketed and are too expensive for the
rural poor.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Background
In Uganda today, the most extreme poverty is found in rural areas. In fact,
according to the Rural Poverty Portal 27% percent of people in rural areas live
below the lowest conventional poverty line, amounting to over 8 million (Rural
Poverty Portal, Statistics, 2010). In 2001, according to the Rural Electrification
Strategy and Plan (RESP), only an estimated 1% of the rural population in Uganda
had access to any sort of modern power source (2012, p. 10). Lack of access is
thought to severely handicap those without power, restricting them from climbing
out of poverty. A modern power source allows for many potential advantages
including opportunities for additional studying after dark by children in the
household, savings on energy expenditure, increased safety, and preservation of
time and effort that would be spent travelling to obtain other power sources. A lack
of these benefits is what is loosely defined 1 as Energy Poverty (The Concept of
Energy Poverty, 2010, para. 2). Living in energy poverty is thought to hold one back
from growing out of income poverty. Certainly, rural electrification is a necessary
part of any viable, long-term development policy.
When discussing rural electrification (RE) in Uganda, it is important to note
that solar currently plays a much smaller role in the process than grid extension
projects. For instance, during the initial Rural Electrification Strategy and
Plan (RESP), solar was expected to connect 80,000 people, while grid extensions
“loosely defined” is used, as the concept is not concretely defined and still has
many different meanings and interpretations.
1
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were expected to connect over 400,000 (RESP 2013-2022, 2012, p. 10). Moreover,
solar is currently budgeted only about $45 million for RESP 2013-2022, while grid
extension and densification is budgeted around $870 million. Therefore, it is
evident that the Ugandan Government and the World Bank, who sponsor Uganda’s
efforts, view solar as important but much less so than grid extension projects.
However, it is also worth noting that the expected public dollars spent per
connection is lower for solar connections than for the grid connections, giving solar
an apparent cost advantage.
Yet, because neither solar nor grid extension projects have been as effective
as expected (only 7% total access in rural areas by 2013 (RESP 2013-2022, 2012, p.
10)) most people do not use either. In fact, most families in rural areas depend on
alternative lighting sources. Examples of which include, kerosene (otherwise
known as paraffin), small replaceable batteries, diesel or gas generators, and paying
for phone charging (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 23, 2014). Not only
can these sources be very dangerous and expensive, causing many injuries, but also
they are largely inadequate.
A lack of access to power harshly cripples the ability of rural institutions to
operate effectively; these include health facilities and schools. As far as health
facilities are concerned, a lack of power makes it incredibly difficult to operate at
night. This causes them to work shorter hours, see less patients and not be able to
provide emergency services at night (Quarterly Monitoring and Evaluation Report,
2013). Furthermore, it is incredibly expensive for these health centers to store
vaccines, as most vaccines need to stay refrigerated at all times. In
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fact, most become impotent if they become warmer than 8 degrees Celsius.
Therefore, connection to a modern electricity source could go a long way to helping
improve public health in many rural areas (Quarterly Monitoring and Evaluation
Report, 2013).
Lastly, education also suffers greatly from lack of access to power. Students
are able to study longer when they have access to power, schools are able to connect
to technology they otherwise wouldn’t be, more lighting makes the school a safer
place at night, and better communication makes teachers more accountable and
more likely to be present to teach (Quarterly Monitoring and Evaluation Report,
2013). Therefore, access to electricity could improve rural schools, the studying
habits of rural students, and create rural transformation in the long run.
1.2 Literature Review
There is much discussion on rural electrification (RE) by scholars and
development practitioners. Not only on the effectiveness of RE, but also on the best
methods to implement RE. While these methods usually vary, the basic ideas can
often be cross-applied to other societies and areas. Overall, the literature seems to
reflect two basic ideas.
The first is that PV specifically, and RE in general, does have a positive effect
on development. In particular, it seems that PV and RE have beneficial effects on
education, including study hours and years completed. Furthermore, it seems to
have a positive effect on incomes and income generating activity diversity.
According to Tanguy Bernard in “Impact Analysis of Rural Electrification Projects in
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Sub-Saharan Africa,” the effects of RE on rural households is undoubtedly positive.
He states that although RE is not a sufficient condition for development “it is
probably a necessary one” (2012, p. 14). Additionally, Bensch, Kluve and Peters
state: “Overall, we find a rather robust indication of positive effects of electrification
on social and economic indicators” (2010, p. 30). They come to these findings by
performing cross sectional evaluations, before and after RE projects begin,
generating qualitative as well as quantitative data. Moreover, Khandker et al.
(2009) find that RE in Vietnam had a positive impact on the time both boys and girls
spent studying, how often they went to school, as well as non-farm and farming
income. According to them, “the income gain due to connectivity is about $22.1 per
month” (2009, p. 33). Additionally they found in Bangladesh that Rural
electrification can increase incomes as much as 30% over an 8 year period and that
“Electricity also leads to a significant improvement in both completed schooling
years and study time for children in rural households” (Khandker, Barnes, Samad,
2009, p. 23). They also came to their conclusions using long-term cross-sectional
data.
The second big idea conveyed by much of the literature is that the process of
RE can be quite difficult because it is expensive. For PV in particular, it is often
difficult for people at the BoP to access the technology. For instance, Tanguy
Bernard (2012) cites Ethiopia’s Universal Electricity Access Program, which, even
with a budget of close to a billion dollars, still has to charge fees between $50 and
$100 to its clients. This makes the program “prohibitive” to most of the population
that lives on less than two dollars a day (Bernard, 2012, p. 14). Additionally,
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although PV may sometimes be cheaper, PV is not necessarily affordable for
everyone. According to Karekezi and Kithyoma, “PV is ideal for the dispersed rural
households and enterprises of Africa and is, in the long-term, a cheaper option than
grid-based electricity” (2002, p. 12). However, PV is not a panacea for RE on its own.
Karekezi and Kithyoma, in reference to a program in Zimbabwe go on to state,
“afﬂuent rural households purchased most of the systems, since over 80% of rural
population could not afford the smallest systems even at the cheapest rates” (2002,
p. 11). Lastly, Khandaker et al. (2009), as well as Khandker, Barnes, Samad (2009),
find that rural electrification benefits the rich more than it benefits the poor. It is
therefore evident, after examining much of the literature, that the non-poor mostly
enjoy the benefits of rural electrification. However, though solar is expensive, it is
pointed out by Ellegård et al. that people are willing to pay more for solar, than
alternative sources such as kerosene and dry batteries (2003). Thus, while solar
systems are often too costly for people at the bottom of the period, a solar product
or system that is only marginally more expensive than kerosene and dry cell
batteries could have very high demand.
The literature is very confident about the potential benefits of RE and
specifically PV, yet very wary of the difficulties standing in the way of uptake.
While there are a number of solutions developing, no one solution will be the
answer for RE. Every country, including Uganda, will have to find its own
solutions to its own challenges to effectively distribute PV and other sources of
power to allow for RE.
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1.3 Justification
Despite all of the attention the literature gives to the impact of PV rural
electrification, and the best ways to implement it, there is relatively little attention
given to the pioneering of technologies that could be accessible by the rural poor.
Additionally, there exists little information about how much money the rural poor,
without access to electricity, are spending on kerosene. In fact, I could only find two
vague estimates of how much a person living in absolute poverty would spend on
kerosene a year. According to Carl Pope, in “Solar Power Off the Grid: Energy Access
for World’s Poor” those at the BoP spend about $180 a year on kerosene alone,
which seems quite high. This estimation, if you could call it that, is un-cited,
unspecified, and not explained (Carl Pope, 2012, para. 5). There is one estimate that
seems fairly reasonable, from a pair of World Bank researchers named Kyran
Sullivan and Douglas Barnes (2007) who discovered that the lowest decile of income
earners bought about 10 liters of kerosene per month. Yet, even this estimate is
very limited in scope, as it only includes Yemen. Therefore, I thought it necessary to
attempt to find an answer to how much the rural poor in Uganda are spending on
their current energy sources to try to determine if PV is a financially viable
alternative.

2.0 Methods
During the course of this study, I was an intern at the Uganda Rural
Electrification Agency. I was able to spend time interviewing people with knowledge
of PV (both inside and outside the agency), informally spoke with and surveyed end-
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users through the audit process to collect qualitative and quantitative data,
participated in meetings, and reviewed documents obtained through REA to again
obtain qualitative and quantitative data. This mix of qualitative and quantitative
methods were the main tools I used to learn about the Solar PV market and RE in
Uganda.
2.1 Interviews
Over the course of my internship I conducted formal interviews with three
people within REA, and one outside of REA. Though the selection process was not
ideal, as all of the interviews inside REA were organized and chosen for me, I was
able to learn about REA and the context of solar PV in RE. Yet, my interview with
Abdallah Kyezira was organized outside of REA, and I therefore had complete
control.
2.2 Field Work
From the 22nd through the 27th of April, I was able to go on a field excursion
to do end-user auditing of PV systems. Through this I was able to collect both
qualitative and quantitative information. The purpose of these end-user audits was
to determine which subsidy claims were legitimate, and which ones were not. This
subsidy program is addressed, at length in Section 3.0. Over the course of the week,
we were able to do more than 50 audits, at 50 different sights. This allowed me
lots of opportunities to informally interview users of REA subsidized solar systems,
which gave great insight into the problems and benefits of the program on the
ground.

9
The end user audits involved checking systems to make sure they were the
correct size and installed appropriately. Additionally, these audits involved asking a
number of questions of the end user to gain information to add to the REA database.
One such question covered the topic of saving on fuel sources after the installation
of solar, others involved asking about changes in livelihood, lifestyle, or if they were
happy with the system. These questions were standardized on the end-user audit
form created in collaboration with the World Bank, it is attached in Appendix C.
Lastly, during the audit journey, we also met with a branch of centenary bank in
Nebbi town, as well as the manager of Dasmond Technologies, a PV distributor, to
discuss with them the solar subsidy system and receive their input.

3.0 Findings and Discussion
Given that the reported rate of rural electrification in 2013 was 7%, there is
obviously much work that needs to be done in order to bring about significant
transformation in rural areas. As such, the Government of Uganda, through the
Rural Electrification Agency, is addressing the problem in many ways. Additionally,
the World Bank is working through the Ugandan government, REA, and the Ministry
of Energy and Ministry of Health to tackle the problem. The overall strategy for
rural electrification is found in the Rural Electrification Strategy and Plan, 20132022 and the Indicative Rural Electrification Master Plan (IREMP) created in 2008.
These two plans have divided RE into two main categories: expansion of the grid
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system and off grid renewables such as solar PV2. Between these two categories, the
Government has set a goal of 26% rural connection by 2022 and universal
connection by 2040.
3.1 Solar PV
The market for solar PV is dynamic. There are many suppliers of all different
qualities and prices. There are many different options for systems, and there are
even government programs and subsidies. What is more, the government policy is
soon to change. REA is currently working with World Bank consultants to formulate
the policy for the next stage of the ERT program.
3.1.1 PVTMA Program
In 2009 the government launched the Photovoltaic Target Market Approach
(PVTMA) program. PVTMA was created to combat the issues in uptake of PV
systems that were found in rural areas during the first stage of the ERT program.
Some examples of which are: cost of the systems, awareness of the potential and
opportunity, risk associated with purchase, lack of institutional frameworks to
provide PV and credit, and the low quality of systems (PVTMA Operational
Guidelines, 2010, p. 3,4). In order to combat those problems, it was a conclusion of
the PVTMA operational guidelines, that REA should provide a subsidy to the end
user, take part in awareness and marketing campaigns, work to create partnerships
2Mini-Grid

systems have not been included because not enough information was
gained to include anything meaningful about them. Additionally, they account for
less then half a percent of total RESP spending. Lastly, there is no major program
responsible for their advancement, or staff members at REA responsible for their
promotion. Consider this footnote and acknowledgement of their existence and
both an implicit and explicit contextualization of their importance.
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between financial institutions (FIs) and REA Eligible Solar Enterprises (REES), and
provide support to REES to build rural infrastructure to improve after sale service.
The PVTMA program had an initial goal of creating 20,000 PV connections by 2013,
though this has now been extended to 2014, with 2016 being the latest possible end
of the initiative (PVTMA Operational Guidelines, 2010, p. 4). As of April 2014,
PVTMA created a total of about 17,000 connections (M. Piggins, personal
communication, April 11th, 2014).
3.1.2 PVTMA Subsidy Program
The subsidy program is the center point of the PVTMA plan. When a system
is installed, 100 meters or more from the closest low voltage line by a REA approved
solar distributor and installer; the system is eligible for a subsidy (M. Piggins,
personal communication, April 10th, 2014). The total amount of that subsidy is $4
per watt, up to a 500 watt system for commercial and institutional uses. This means
that the highest amount a commercial or institutional end user can receive is a total
of $2,000 or, using the REA pegged exchange rate of one to 2,540 (USD to UGX), UGX
5,080,000. For home systems the subsidy is $5.5/Wp, up to a max of a 50
Wp system or UGX 698,500. Individual PV providers are limited in the amount of
total subsidy money they can receive based upon their contract as a REES (PVTMA
Operation Guidelines, 2010, p.4). In each contract between REA and the solar PV
distributor the company receives a total allocation of subsidy funds from REA that
they are eligible for on a system-by-system basis. The company is then distributed
the subsidy for each system they install, until they have received their allotment of
subsidy money. After they have received the total allotment, they can no longer
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receive subsidies until they have formed a new contract with REA. The highest
allotment according to the PVTMA Implementation Status Report (September 2013)
was designated for Solar Now at a total of $1,155,000. As of September 2013, they
had $639,516 yet unutilized. However, Solar Now is an outlier, Most companies
only had an allocation of between $10 and $85 thousand. In total, the subsidy
program was allocated $4.5 million to disburse to PV companies (PVTMA
Implementation Status Report, 2013, p. 2).
The subsidy program has been structured to involve four main parties: REA,
financial institutions, PV companies and end users. The framework of the system
has been structured as to overcome the issues of financing and cost for the end user.
PVTMA has involved financial institutions including commercial banks, MFI’s, and
SACCOs (PVTMA Operation Guidelines, 2010, p. 12, 13). By encouraging them to
create provisions for solar loans and partner with solar PV companies, it is hoped
that it will be easier for the end user, as they will be more able to find credit for a
solar system. Under this set-up, REA distributes the subsidy to the financial
institution to distribute to the PV provider. This institutional framework is
supposed to allow “for transparency, monitoring, and to minimize misapplication of
funds” (PVTMA Operational Guidelines, 2010, p. 13), ensuring that the subsidy is
actually achieving its objective, as the money is more traceable through registered
financial institutions, as opposed to simply giving it to the PV company who may not
pass it on to the end-user.
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As demonstrated above, both the end user and REA give money to the FI,
which then purchases the system from the solar PV company, to install for the end
user3 (PVTMA Operation Guidelines, 2010, p. 13). In this way the subsidy is
distributed and can be monitored, and the end user receives the credit necessary to
finance the purchase of the system. The financial institution is thus handling two
crucial steps of the process and enabling the PV connection. Though this enables
more connections, it also often burdens end users with debt that they may not be
able to pay back.
However, it is also possible for end users to receive the system without
having to take out a loan, though this only common for commercial and institutional
users. Yet, some FI’s have set up saving systems that allow potential end users to
save money in an account to purchase the system after they have saved the needed
REA does not always distribute the subsidy through the financial institution;
sometimes it does give the subsidy directly to the PV company. However, the
PVTMA operational guidelines offer no distinction between the two forms of
disbursement.
3
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amount (PVTMA Operation Guidelines, 2010, p. 15). This is advantageous as savings
account fees are typically cheaper than paying interest rates. Therefore, savings
accounts bring down the total cost for end users. If the system is purchased on cash,
the subsidy is distributed directly to the PV provider after the cash payment is made.
In order to ensure that the system has been installed, that it has been
installed well, and that the PV company claiming the subsidy is in no way
committing fraud, end-user audits must take place before the subsidy is approved.
This involves a trained end-user auditor visiting the site and completing the “PV
Audit and Verification Questionnaire,” included in the PVTMA operational
guidelines. Only after a system passes the end-user audit is it eligible to receive a
subsidy from REA (PVTMA Operation Guidelines, 2010, p. 14). These audits can be
very slow and sometimes take almost a year to complete (M. Piggins, personal
communication, April 25th, 2014). In order to ensure that the PV companies have
enough capital to continue installing systems while awaiting subsidies, the FIs are
instructed to release the total less subsidy as soon as the system is installed
(PVTMA Operation Guidelines, 2010, p. 14).

3.1.2.1 Non-REA Subsidies
Though the primary focus of this study is on REA PV programs, it is
important to note that there is also a program that promotes solar PV not based
at REA. The program is part of the World Bank ERT Initiative. It aims to
equip institutions in rural Uganda with solar PV power. The program is run through
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. It provides, free of charge,
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solar systems to public schools and health institutions in rural Uganda (Quarterly
Monitoring and Evaluation Report, 2013). In health centers the systems are used to
stay open longer, provide access to better nighttime care, and refrigerate vaccines.
In schools, lights are used for safety, longer studying time, and phone charging for
staff to improve attendance and communication. According to the Quarterly
Monitoring and Evaluation Report done by MOFPED, these systems allowed for
more patients to be tended to in health centers, increased the number of centers
that were able to store vaccines, and lowered costs on materials (2013).
Additionally, schools saw increased performance, enrollment and teacher
attendance. Thus, while these subsidies may not be part of the larger PVTMA
program, they are none-the-less improving health care and education in rural
Uganda.
3.1.3 Awareness and Sensitization
As part of the PVTMA program REA undertakes sensitization and awareness
efforts to increase demand and uptake in the market. Awareness, as listed in the
PVTMA Operational Guidelines, can be one of the biggest issues to uptake (M.
Piggins, personal communication, April 9th, 2014). Not only do potential end users
lack an understanding of possible opportunities available to them, but often times
there is much misinformation in the market. Some people believe the systems can
ruin crops or cause disease. One person that we spoke with during the audit
process even mentioned that many people in the area think it has the ability to
detect thieves (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 25th, 2014). While this
particular example may not deter a potential end-user from purchasing a system, it
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reflects the massive amount of misinformation in many parts of the rural market.
What is more, many poorly installed systems stop functioning after a very limited
period of time, do not get serviced due to the poor infrastructure available to the PV
firms, and therefore discourage others from purchasing a system (ERT Project
Summary, 2014, p. 81).
In order to address this issue, REA conducts campaigns across the country.
These campaigns involve community meetings, reaching out to leaders in local
areas, radio talk shows and advertisements. Some of these campaigns are run
through the community outreach department at REA, but according to the head of
the department, Patricia Litho, “ERT campaigns have been Independent of
mainstream REA activities” (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 9 th, 2014).
However, there is no one in the ERT department responsible for community
outreach. Thus it is evident that community outreach, awareness and sensitization
are something that is lacking for solar PV. For instance, when speaking to
representatives of both Centenary Bank and Dasmond Technologies LTD, the
number one issue they cited was lack of awareness by potential end users (M.
Piggins, Personal Communication, April 24th, 2014). Furthermore, the
representative of Dasmond continued to emphasize the issue, bringing it up
multiple times in the discussion. This indicates that the awareness efforts taken on
by REA have not been sufficient to reach their goals.
3.2 Solar PV Market in Rural Uganda
The market for solar PV in Uganda has hugely expanded since the turn of the
century. Not only are there many more solar providers, but also the range of
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products on the market has grown significantly. Moreover, demand is now more
diverse, from the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, businesses and
residences.
This presents a challenge to RE efforts. According to Abdalla Kyezira, the
biggest market for PV currently exists in urban areas (M. Piggins, personal
communication, April 29th, 2014). This is likely due to higher concentrations of
wealth, a greater dependence on electricity, and the inconsistency of grid power.
The increased demand created by the urban areas, shifts the concentration of PV
providers from being solely placed in rural areas to being mainly focused on urban
(M. Piggins, personal communication, April 29th, 2014). According to the laws of
basic economics, not only does this drive up prices, but also it reduces the need for
solar distributors to innovate new distribution and finance techniques in rural
areas. The impact is higher prices and greater stagnancy in the rural market.

3.2.1 Firms
There are many firms heavily invested in the rural market. In fact, according
to the PVTMA Implementation Status Report September 2013, there are 19
companies currently registered to receive REA subsidies (Table 1). What is more,
these firms are also creating a lot of market penetration. Every trading center we
visited had at least one solar system, even if it was small. Most of these systems
were not registered with REA (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 26 th,
2014). This indicates that even without the subsidy, there is a demand for solar
power.
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Two firms dominate the market. According to Kyezira, Solar Now and FRES
Technologies have the biggest market share in Uganda, both of which are registered
for the PVTMA program (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 29 th, 2014).
However, he also mentioned that these companies don’t have the same market niche
as some of the smaller rural based companies, and therefore can’t compete in
certain areas. Yet, despite this, the two biggest companies, by the beginning of 2014,
had installed almost 5,000 of the total 14,000 systems installed under PVTMA (M.
Piggins, personal communication, April 11th th, 2014).
According to the “PVTMA Implementation Status Report” (September 2013,
Table 2), Solar Now had installed the most systems with a total reported to REA of
2,450 since the beginning of PVTMA in 2009. However, this only counts the systems
that have received the subsidy. FRES had installed a comparable 2,147, yet had a
higher watt peak (implying greater power generation and subsidy distribution) of
281,937 watts against Solar Now’s 132,385 watts. The next biggest distributor is
Solar Sense, who distributed 1,392 systems in the same period, with a watt peak
of 157,052 watts (PVTMA Implementation Status Report, September 2013, Table 2).
Thus, while solar now seems to install the highest number of systems, they tend to be
smaller systems likely used for residences. Additionally, of the major distributors,
FRES seems to distribute a larger number of higher watt systems, averaging over
131 watts per system.
It is important to note as well, that these two companies, FRES and Solar Now,
use different financing mechanisms than any of the other 19 listed companies in the
2013 PVTMA Implementation Status Report. FRES operates on the “Fee for Service”
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platform. Instead of working through the system set up by PVTMA, FRES has
innovated a different scheme based off of a system in Zambia. Instead of selling the
system to a user, they simply charge an installation fee for the system and for every
day that it is used. According to information obtained from Joel Leku, a REA
employee overseeing PVTMA, FRES charges as little as one dollar a day for a home
system up to 80Wp, and can charge more than 4 dollars a day for some larger
systems (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 14th, 2014). The advantage of
this sort of financing mechanism is that if the system stops working, people can
stop paying and service will be conducted on the system more quickly, creating
more accountability for the installer to install the system correctly and correct any
issues in a timely manner (ERT III Project Summary Paper, 2014, p. 80). Due to the
fact that the subsidy covers installation costs, it becomes easier for the end user to
finance the system as initial payments are small and they aren’t charged exorbitant
interest rates (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 16thm 2014). However,
one of the drawbacks of the system is that many end users prefer to actually own
the system, which is not allowed for using this mechanism of payment. Still,
overall, according to Patricia Nakku, another REA employee working on PVTMA,
the FRES model’s “advantages outweigh disadvantages” (M. Piggins, personal
communication, April 16th, 2014).
Solar Now’s model is more similar to the overall PVTMA structure than the
FRES model. Solar Now’s model has been dubbed the “Pay Plan” model. The
essence of the idea is to consolidate the jobs of the solar provider and the credit
institution into one entity. Thus, Solar Now not only provides solar systems, but
also provides financing (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 16 th, 2014).
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The advantages of this system are very similar to the advantages of the fee-forservice model. As the payment and system servicing is conducted by the same
entity, the system has to work for Solar Now to get paid. This model again
overcomes one of the main issues in the market, the unreliability of solar providers.
Increased reliability leads to greater trust by customers, and therefore a greater
willingness to take up the systems. Increased reliability in essence acts as a
marketing tool, as the success of users systems makes others interested in
obtaining them (ERT III Project Summary Paper, 2014, p. 81).
Yet, the Pay Plan model is not without challenges. The biggest issue of the
model is that Solar Now is not able to offer credit at as low of a rate as SACCOs or
MFIs. For instance, for a 50Wp system, Solar Now charges about 80% annual
interest (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 31 st, 2014). This cost increase
could be found to be prohibitive of some potential end-users reducing uptake by
those near the BoP. Yet, using credit from Solar Now may be easier than from an
MFI or SACCO, as there is less bureaucracy, waiting time, and a higher likelihood of
obtaining the loan.

3.2.2 Costs
Perhaps the most prohibitive barrier in the market for solar PV is the cost of
systems. As demonstrated below, costs can be very high, especially for those at the
BoP. Below are the costs laid out for systems of different sizes and different
purposes. They are laid out to account for savings over the estimated life of the
battery (three years), the cost of interest if bought on credit, and less the subsidy.
The savings estimates are drawn from end-users surveyed during the auditing
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process, as well as estimates from Joel Leku and other end-user auditors. They are
meant to reflect what a family or business seeking a system of a given size would
spend on energy a week. The costs listed are taken from cost lists obtained from
REA, as well as a few company websites (Solar Now, Awango, and Barefoot).

Small System Net Cost Over Useful Life
Awango on
Awango
Barefoot on
Credit
Cash
Credit
Cost
Interest at 35%**
Total Cost
Saving Over Useful
Life*
Net Cost Over Useful
Life

Barefoot
Cash

UGX 96,000

96,000

100,000

100,000

33,600

0

35,000

0

129,600

96,000

135,000

100,000

284,960

284,960

284,960

284,960

-155,360

-188,960

-149,960

-184,960

*Estimated at 1,000 cycles or 2.74 years and 2,000 UGX per week on kerosene, low
estimate based on information from Joel Leku, end user auditors, and end users I spoke
to.
**Based on estimates from PVTMA Implementation Status Report.
Load: 1-2 lights for 4 hours, phone charging
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20WP System Net Cost Including Average MFI Interest, Less Savings
Solar Sense

Cost

Green Energy PVTMA

UGX 661,000

859,000

912,950

Subsidy in USD

110

110

110

Subsidy in UGX

279,400

279,400

279,400

Price Less Subsidy

381,600

579,600

633,550

Plus 35% interest After 20% Down

106,848

463,680

506,840

Total

488,448

1,043,280

1,140,390

Less Savings Over Estimated Useful Life*

468,000

468,000

468,000

Net Total
20,448
575,280
672,390
Load: 2 lamps for 4 hours, phone charge, and radio
*Estimated at 1,000 cycles or 2.74 years and 3,000 UGX per week on kerosene, low
estimate based on information from Joel Leku, end user auditors, and end users I spoke
to.
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40WP System Cost after Interest, Less Savings

PVTMA Standard Solar Sense Dasmond* Solar Now* Solar Now Credit
(50WP)
(50WP)

40 WP Price

UGX 1,480,550

1,624,000

1,048,900

1,250,000

1,510,000

Subsidy in $

220

220

220

275

275

Conversion to UGX

558,800

558,800

558,800

698,500

698,500

Price less Subsidy

921,750

1,065,200

490,100

551,500

811,500

Plus 35% Interest After 20% Down

258,090

298,256

137,228

154,420

-

1,179,840

1,363,456

627,328

705,920

811,500

468,000

468,000

468,000

468,000

468,000

Net cost over useful life
711,840
895,456
159,328
237,920
Load: 4 lamps for 4 hours, phone charging, radio
*Most accurate estimates of systems this size according to Abdallah Kyezira, Joel Leku
others are believed to be out of date, intentionally inflated, or not competitive.
**Estimated at 1000 cycles or 2.74 years and 3,000 UGX per week spending on
kerosene, low estimate based on information from Joel Leku, end user auditors, and
end users spoken to.

343,500

Total
Less savings over estimated useful life**
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Net Cost Over Estimated Useful Life of Commercial PV System*
Already Established Business on Credit From
Commercial Bank
Average total Cost

UGX 4,250,000

New Business on Credit From
Commercial Bank
Average total Cost

UGX
4,250,000

Less Subsidy

2,438,400

Less Subsidy

2,438,400

Cost after subsidy
Plus Interest at 120%
after 20% down

1,811,600

Cost after subsidy
Plus Interest at 120%
after 20% down

1,811,600

Less revenue per
month***

(11,880,0
00)

(7,249,264)

Net cost over estimated
useful life

(8,329,26
4)

Already Established Business on Credit From
SACCO

New Business on Credit
from SACCO

Less Savings over
estimated life**
Net cost over estimated
useful life

Average total Cost

1,739,136
(10,800,000)

UGX 4,250,000

1,739,136

Average total Cost

UGX
4,250,000

Less Subsidy

2,438,400

Less Subsidy

2,438,400

Cost after subsidy
Plus Interest at 35% after
20% down

1,811,600

Cost after subsidy
Plus Interest at 35% after
20% down

1,811,600

Less revenue per
month***

(11,880,0
00)

Net cost over estimated
useful life

(9,561,15
2)

Less Savings over
estimated life**
Net cost over estimated
useful life

507,248
(10,800,000)
(8,481,152)

507,248
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Already Established
Business on Cash
Average total Cost

New Business on
Cash
UGX 4,250,000

Average total Cost

UGX
4,250,000

Less Subsidy

2,438,400

Less Subsidy

2,438,400

Cost after subsidy

1,811,600

Cost after subsidy

1,811,600

Less revenue per
month***

(11,880,0
00)

Net cost over estimated
useful life

(10,068,4
00)

Less Savings over
estimated life**
Net cost over estimated
useful life

(10,800,000)
(8,988,400)

*Load: of 2 DC Lamps (7 watts, 4hrs), 20 phone charges, 20 haircuts or 2 DC lamps (7
watts, 4hrs) 21" TV, Stereo (each for 6 hours), about 200Wp
**Estimated at 1000 cycles or 2.74 years and 10,000 UGX per day spending on
conventional energy, low estimate based on information from Joel Leku, end user
auditors, and end users spoken to.
***Using low end of user self-estimates charging 7 phones a day, giving 7 haircuts,
lower revenue than all of the businesses witnessed in the field.
****Estimated life of three years taken from low-end projections by REA end user
auditors, Abdallah Kyezira, and Joel Leku.
It is apparent here that the most beneficial systems to end-users are those
obtained for commercial use, having a net benefit to end-users of over 7 million
shillings. The next most beneficial are the small, plug and play systems, saving users
around 150,000 shillings over the expected useful life. These small systems allow for
the same development impacts, while also allowing families to save money that can
be used on school fees or reinvested in income generating activities. Therefore, it
would seem that if the plug and play systems could be distributed, financed and
marketed in the correct fashion, there would be a considerable market for the
smallest of systems.
However, this is slightly problematic. The systems that are currently in
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highest demand in rural areas are those of the 40-50Wp varieties, as most
households in these regions desire access to 3 lights, phone charging and a radio
system (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 24 th, 2014). Yet, even the
cheapest version listed above costs over a million shillings. While people are often
willing to pay more for a solar system than they would for other means of power,
they are often unable to bear this cost, especially those at the BoP. Certainly, this is a
huge barrier in the market, that if overcome, could allow for much greater uptake
and a larger number of connections.
Furthermore, it is evident here, that even with the subsidy, people at the BoP
who want to acquire larger home systems would likely not be able to as the cost is
prohibitively high. Therefore, the subsidy is ineffective at reaching those at the BoP
and is subsidizing solar PV systems for the rural upper and middle class. This
appears to be unnecessary, as un-registered and therefore un-subsidized solar is
ubiquitous in trading centers. Moreover, the fact that many PV providers did not
feel the need to pass on subsidies to end users before they were funneled through
FIs, as discussed above, suggests that their customers didn’t need the lower prices.
Thus, it is evident that these subsidies are not effectively or efficiently creating more
connections than would be created in their absence.
It is important to note here, that the FRES systems are not included in this
analysis as the payments are structured differently than for the distributors above.
However, if you were to compare the smallest FRES system with a comparable
system (“institutional” above), the cost would be near the same if not higher, as the
user would be paying a dollar a day, less the cost of installation due to
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the subsidy, totaling 2,737,500 over the three year estimated useful life listed above.
3.3 Challenges and Way Forward
The PVTMA program has not been as successful as it was hoped to be. While
it was anticipated that it would create 20,000 connections by 2013, it fell short of
that goal only creating about 14,000 (ERT Project Summary, 2014, p. 32).
Furthermore, the program not only needed an extension, but also increased funding
to reach its projected goal. Therefore it is obvious that the PVTMA program has not
been effective in creating new connections.
In my time in the field, I noticed that cost and awareness tended to be the
biggest barriers to uptake, with cost being the most prohibitive to the BoP, despite
PVTMA efforts. Awareness efforts seem to have struggled due to the money and
concentration given to them, not necessarily their design. The representative of
Dasmond Technologies LTD in Nebbi also suggested this idea. He indicated that his
company, as it was small, did not have the capacity to conduct the necessary
awareness campaigns (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 24 th,
2014). Furthermore, this idea has been documented in the PVTMA guidelines, and
is one that has been clearly spelled out to REA and known by all parties involved in
PVTMA from the beginning. Thus, the issue is not a lack of understanding of the
problem, but a lack of capacity to address it properly.
Though awareness is an issue, the most significant issue that I witnessed in
the field was the cost of the systems. Rarely did a system cost less than a million
shillings after the subsidy. Moreover, even when a system did cost less than a
million shillings, it was only marginally less (M. Piggins, personal communication,
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April 25h, 2014). While most of the systems were larger systems, and therefore not
the least expensive options, for what they were powering they were still very
expensive. This reinforces the issue of lack of access for those at the BoP. What is
more, the PVTMA program does little to support the sale and distribution of small,
cost effective plug and play systems. The subsidy program creates an incentive for
PV companies to upsell their clients, often into systems that are oversized. If
smaller, plug and play systems were more heavily supported, even if only through
marketing and sensitization efforts, I believe there would much
greater uptake in the market especially at the BoP. Though some may disagree
about the effectiveness of these small systems (Mr. Kyezira even stated he doesn’t
feel it is any more than a simple torch or flashlight and certainly not a real
connection) these systems can create the development benefits of larger systems by
allowing children to read and study at night, allowing people to more easily charge
their phones, allowing families to avoid the dangers of kerosene, and, due to their
cost effectiveness, allowing families to save money (M. Piggins, personal
communication, April 29th, 2014). Due to the cost of larger systems, it would seem
that the most effective way to create the development impacts of solar for the most
rural households would be to promote small plug and play systems. Though, for
these systems, the subsidy does not seem to be necessary. Forming partnerships in
order to create effective financing schemes affordable by the rural poor, developing
distribution channels, and carrying out large-scale awareness and sensitization
activities would go a long way, however, to improving the lives of many in rural
Uganda.
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Yet, this is much easier said than done. People near the bottom of the
pyramid, don’t often have a lump of sum of cash on hand large enough to purchase a
plug and play system, such as an Awango by Total or a Barefoot system (M. Piggins,
personal communication, April 23rd, 2014). While this may not always be the case,
especially just after harvest season, distribution would still likely be more effective
if there was a credit system created for these products. If the credit system were
able to directly substitute payments for kerosene into payments for the solar
system, the financial transition would be seamless. Moreover, after a short period of
time, the system would be paid off and the user would be enjoying higher quality,
effectively free power (a possible financing mechanisms discussed below in
recommendations section). If REA was to advance the distribution of a system of this
type, it could increase the rate of connections, be more likely to reach the
connection goal, and more effectively impact the BoP.
Due to the high cost of systems discussed above, most of the end-users
purchasing systems through the PVTMA program, are not at the BoP. Many are
commercial institutions, which, as demonstrated in 3.2.2, stand to benefit greatly
from these systems. In fact, even the lowest earner I witnessed in the field was
earning UGX 400,000 a month by giving haircuts and charging phones (M. Piggins,
personal communication, April 23rd, 2014). This points to the affordability of these
systems for businesses in rural areas. Furthermore, using the cost calculations
above, even if a typical business did not receive the subsidy for their system, they
would still be able to profit greatly from it. Therefore, it seems evident that in order
to promote commercial use of solar, REA and the ERT program, do not need to
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subsidize most commercial institutions. While the subsidy doubtless helps them be
more profitable, it is not addressing any serious barriers in the market, as the
systems are already affordable and profitable for commercial institutions. However,
the existence of the subsidy leads to companies over selling their customers and
giving them a system that they may not need. Moreover, in many instances, a
system that in reality is meant for home use is feigned as being for commercial use
during the auditing process, allowing the company to over sell their customer and
collect a bigger subsidy (M. Piggins, personal communication, April 15 th, 2014).
This not only creates difficulties in the system, but it also has the potential to create
unreal expectations for future end-users. Thus, while the subsidy program does
make systems more affordable for households, it can cause them to be given an
oversized system, which is often still too expensive, when they could do with a
smaller one. Furthermore, the subsidy program for commercial institutions is
largely unnecessary, and while it makes the systems more affordable, commercial
institutions would likely be able to profit from them regardless.

3.3.1 Future of PVTMA
As the PVTMA program comes to end (expected by the end of 2014) the new
phase of the ERT program will institute a new promotion instrument for solar PV
(M. Piggins, personal communication, April 14th, 2014). According to the RESP
2013-2022, solar PV is expected to create 140,000 new connections. That means
14,000 connections a year (2012, p. 10). Given the current pace of 14,000 in four
years, this is not likely unless the program is changed in some significant way. The
PVTMA program and ERT II were able to create a larger network of distributors,
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more awareness of the potential of solar, and greater solar infrastructure across
rural areas. These improvements to the infrastructure of the market are expected to
lead to an increased rate of connection. However, just relying on this improved
infrastructure and doing business as usual will likely not increase the rate of
connections by 300%. Therefore, a few options are now being considered to take
the place of PVTMA for the next 10 years.
The first option has been titled the owner/vendor model (ERT Project
Summary, 2014, p. 82). It is essentially the same system that is already in place.
However, to encourage MFIs to participate, REA will offer long term financing.
Additionally, REA will encourage MFIs to have technical teams in order to boost
service provision in rural areas and PV companies to run their own pay plans. This
method does not vary much from the current PVTMA, but it does encourage more
technical capacity in rural areas, as well as more credit easily available in the system
(ERT Project Summary, 2014, p. 82). It is loosely based on the Solar Now approach
(M. Piggins, personal communication, April 16th, 2014).
However, REA should be careful to use this approach, as the prices of Solar
Now systems tend to be on the lower end of the market. This may be the reason for
their success in connecting end-users, not necessarily their model. Additionally, the
solar now credit system is more expensive than most MFI’s, which may prohibit
many from accessing the market. Despite this, the accountability in the system is
certainly a positive, and with REA assisted financing, the issue of cost of financing
may be overcome.
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A second option, which is not mutually exclusive to the owner/vendor model,
is known as the REA/service provider model. This model essentially promotes the
use of small solar lanterns and plug and play systems (ERT Project Summary, 2014,
p. 83). Under this model, service providers would carry out market assessments,
presenting the demand to REA. REA would then do bulk collection of all reported
demand to take advantage of economies of scale. REA will then give the systems to
the service providers, who can sell them on credit or larger systems on the fee-forservice platform. After they have been paid back, they will give the money to REA,
where it will return to the revolving fund to repeat the process all over again (ERT
Project Summary, 2014, p. 83). The advantage of this system is that it would
promote smaller systems for people at the BoP. Though the model is only in its
preliminary stages, a specialized financing and distribution mechanism has yet to be
established, which, in order to access the BoP, is likely necessary. Despite this, the
model has a lot of potential.
Another proposed model is known as the Micro/Nano grid system.
Essentially this model promotes the fee-for-service platform (ERT Project Summary,
2014, p. 83). Though it has not been very developed, the model would seek to
increase the participation in the fee-for-service model. This model has promise, as
FRES has been very successful in connecting end-users. However, it should be taken
with a grain of salt, as FRES systems are relatively cheap, especially in the larger
sizes. For this reason it is possible that the FRES price is what is causing them to
install more systems than other providers, not necessarily that their model is more
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effective. Yet, the fee-for-service model has been shown to provide greater
service to customers and that is certainly one reason to promote the model.
While all of these possible programs are in the early stage of formulation,
they all have the potential to be very successful. Moreover, they are not mutually
exclusive and therefore can all be promoted at the same time. With the
improvements made on the distribution of bigger systems through the
Owner/Vendor Model and the Micro/Nano Grid System, and the promotion of
smaller systems for the BoP through the REA/service provider model, the future of
REA sponsored PV programs may reach every level of rural society.

4.0 Conclusion
As the percentage of rural households that are connected to a power source in
Uganda is around a mere 7% as of 2013, there is obviously a lot of headway that
needs to be made in order to achieve the RESP 2013-2022 goal of a 26% connection
rate in rural areas, and the greater goal of a completely electrified Uganda by 2040.
While it is obvious that solar PV is not the main tool being used to electrify rural
regions, it doubtlessly has an important role to play in low population density areas,
places far from the grid, and to help connect those at the BoP.
As the PVTMA has fallen short of its goal of 20,000 connections in 5 years, and
the expectations for number of connections in the RESP 2013-2022 have only
increased, it is obvious that REA needs to change course to achieve its goal. Firstly,
sensitization and awareness campaigns need to be ramped up. It was a commonly
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cited issue by those on the supply side of the market (FIs and PV providers).
Additionally, the subsidy program has shown to be ineffective at achieving the
numbers targeted and has merely catered to the rural middle and upper classes,
hardly giving access to the people at the BoP. While there are a few plans in the
works to change the system for ERT III, discussed above, if REA does not take
advantage of cost effective plug and play technology to target the BoP, it would seem
unlikely that they will reach their goal. Although people often desire bigger systems
and providers often want to sell bigger systems, they are usually not affordable or
needed, as the development impacts can still be realized with smaller systems.
Moreover, on top of better success in education, improved safety, and time
saved on traveling to charge phones and buy kerosene, these inexpensive solar
systems also allow families to save money on energy. The saving can then be used
to ensure financial stability, pay school fees, be reinvested to improve crop yields or
to generate other forms of income.
Though promoting income-generating activities would seem to be a positive
practice, commercial systems do not need to be promoted, as they are usually cost
effective and available. Smaller systems, however, are not widely available. Thus, in
order to create the most connections and create the biggest development impact,
REA should refocus on the BoP and create a financing and distribution mechanism
for small solar systems that allows them to be easily accessed by the rural poor.

5.0 Recommendations
Given the market conditions currently faced by those in rural areas, and as is
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established above, the most sensible systems to promote are the small plug and play
systems. Therefore, REA should adopt a policy promoting the selling and
distribution of smaller, cost effective systems. Two examples of this type of system
are listed above, Awango by Total, and Barefoot power (particularly, the Barefoot
Firefly Mobile Family System, which includes two lights, and phone charging).
In order to support these systems, REA need not subsidize these systems.
They are already affordable to people at the BoP. Subsidizing the systems is
unsustainable in the long term and would create unrealistic expectations for endusers after the subsidy program ends. Additionally, due to the fact that the
systems are only likely to last around three years, they would need to be
purchased again after the three years. This second purchase could potentially be
dis-incentivized due to a higher cost relative to the original purchase.
Instead of subsidizing these systems REA should create strong distribution and
financing mechanisms to ensure the distribution of the systems to the people at the
BoP who need them. One way in which to do this is to create partnerships between
companies that sell these systems and SACCOs or savings groups. The systems
could be sold through SACCOs and savings groups to ensure that there is an
accountability structure in place to collect payments and distribute systems to
people far outside of trading centers. Moreover, working through already
established institutions could increase trust in the systems by the potential endusers. Distributors could attend meetings of these organizations and pitch the
product to clients. In this way the SACCOs and savings groups would also act as a
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marketing mechanism.
The systems could be sold in a rent-to-own fashion, as to not burden users
with debt. Since they would be sold through SACCOs and savings groups, payments
could be collected on regular basis during savings groups or SACCO meetings. A rent
to own structure would allow end-users to directly substitute their spending on
other energy sources with the payments for the solar system. Ideally, the
configuration of the rent-to-own system would have the end-user owning the
system after only one year or less. If the user were to fail to make a payment, the
SACCO would inform the distributor, who would then go and reclaim the system. It
would then be kept by the distributor and made available to the original end-user
upon their completion of the next payment. If the solar system failed to work, the
end-user could refuse to make payments until the system was fixed or replaced. If
the system were replaced, the distributor would, ideally, bear the cost, allowing the
rent payments made on the previous system to count towards the new system.
REA would provide low cost financing to system distributors on a revolving basis in
order to allow the distributors to have enough capital to continue selling systems.
This would allow for the distributor to take on the credit risk, as opposed to the enduser. A structure such as this would permit an easy transition between current
sources of energy and solar PV systems, and would likely increase the rate of
connection, allowing many people at the BoP access to solar PV technology.
Though PVTMA and ERT II have increased the available infrastructure for the
dissemination of solar PV, if REA does not change course the goals of ERT III will not
be met. It will doubtlessly be a challenge, but if REA takes serious steps to include
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people at the BoP in the benefits of the ERT program and increases its awareness
campaigns, it is not unreasonable that the goal of 14,000 connections per year for
the next 10 years can be met.
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